THE NOVEL - SUMMARY AND NOTES

CHAPTER 13

In this chapter, Machiavelli addresses the role of auxiliary troops-those furnished by a powerful ally whom a prince can call upon for aid. Using an example fresh in his mind, Machiavelli retells the plight of Julius II, who took the risk of asking for assistance from auxiliary troops in his desire to expand his dominions. Fortunately for him, however, an incident occurred that saved him from the full effect of his bad decision. His Spanish auxiliaries, having been defeated by his enemies at Ravenna, were running away when the Swiss suddenly appeared on the battlefield and drove back the enemy. Because of this bit of luck, Julius escaped becoming a prisoner of either his enemies or his auxiliaries.

Other notable examples of the unwise use of auxiliaries include the Florentines, who took a big risk by hiring French soldiers to wage battle for them against the city-state of Pisa (the French could just as easily have attacked the unarmed Florentines), and the emperor of Constantinople, who, to resist attacks by his neighbors, imported ten thousand troops to his territory only to have them later refuse to leave his country. The lesson to be learned from these examples is clear, asserts Machiavelli: if anyone wants to be defeated, let him employ auxiliary troops-for they are much more dangerous even than mercenaries.

What, then, are the best troops for a prince to engage in protecting his principality? The wise prince, says Machiavelli, should rely exclusively upon his own native troops and should prefer defeat with them rather than victory with the troops of others. Native troops are comprised of citizens of the nation and thus are loyal to the state and the prince. They fight well because they are defending their own nation, freedom, and prince.

NOTE: TAKING THE OFFENSIVE

Although Machiavelli recognizes the significance of defense in maintaining a powerful military, in Chapters 12 to 14 his emphasis is on offensive warfare. In many ways his arguments for seizing the initiative in enlisting troops, developing war strategies, and stockpiling armaments suggest late twentieth-century dilemmas posed by the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. You need to remember, however, that The Prince is offered in part as a strategic blueprint for Lorenzo de' Medici. Machiavelli's point is that Lorenzo must take the initiative in building a Florentine army that is loyal, powerful, and well armed.

Machiavelli also speaks with contempt about the use of mercenaries in military warfare in his Art of War. He blames them for the loss of personal liberty and political freedom and points to their cowardice when discussing battles lost or cities ravaged. He is also bitter toward the Swiss, blaming them for the Italian loss of morale in warfare. His observations may have been based on his experience as a former secretary of the republic of Florence, in which post he saw how unsuccessful mercenary troops were in helping Florence in its military campaign against the city-state of Pisa.

The best example of the role that native troops might play in defending a prince, says Machiavelli, is to be found in the career of Cesare Borgia. Cesare began his conquest of Romagna by enlisting the aid of French auxiliary troops. When the French became a threat to his power, Cesare abandoned them and employed mercenaries. Neither the auxiliary forces nor the mercenaries proved reliable or useful, however, so Cesare finally engaged his own loyal subjects to conquer the greatest part of his new territory. When he had none but his own troops, his reputation increased steadily, and he was never more highly esteemed than when everyone saw that he was thoroughly master of his armies.

Machiavelli also relates the story of Hiero of Syracuse. Having been made general of the army, Hiero quickly perceived that mercenary troops were not useful. It seemed to Hiero that he could neither keep nor dismiss them with safety, so he had them all put to death and cut to pieces. Afterward, he carried on the war exclusively with his own troops and won many battles in his quest for power.

It is also possible to supplement native troops with mercenaries, resulting in "mixed" troops. But mixed troops, too, create problems. The addition of foreign troops frequently results in a loss of morale among the native troops, and may provoke bitter quarreling that undermines the spirit of the battle campaign. For example, Charles VII, father of Louis XI, king of France, delivered France from English rule by depending solely upon his own troops. He even organized regular companies of artillery, cavalry, and infantry. Later, however, his son disbanded the infantry and hired Swiss soldiers to replace them. By giving prominence to the Swiss, Louis disheartened his own troops and caused his mounted forces to depend on the support of the mercenaries. In time, the French began to think that they could not succeed without the Swiss. Later, the French could not even hold their own against the Swiss. France would have been invincible, says Machiavelli, if the military system established by Charles VII had been preserved and extended. But the shortsightedness of men leads them to adopt any measure that seems good at the moment, even though it has poison concealed within it.

A prince who does not promptly recognize evils as they arise cannot therefore be called wise. Unfortunately, laments Machiavelli, this ability is rare. He concludes that no prince who does not have an army of his own can ever be secure, and that a prince will become wholly dependent upon fortune if in times of adversity he lacks the means to defend himself. A prince must therefore build his reputation of power on a strong army composed of his own subjects or citizens. He should also follow the example of Philip of Macedon, father of Alexander the Great, and organize an army that exists only to serve the state and its prince.

NOTE: THE NEED FOR LOYAL TROOPS

You might have supposed that Machiavelli's ardor for native troops would have cooled as a result of their disastrous showing in 1512, the year before The Prince was written, when they were sent to defend the city of Prato but were brushed aside by the advancing Spanish infantry. In fact, however, Machiavelli's enthusiasm for native armies remained undiminished. In The Art of War (1520), he continues to use some of the arguments advanced in The Prince. The first part of The Art of War is given over to vindicating the "citizen army" against those who doubt its usefulness.

You should also now better understand why Machiavelli felt so impressed by Cesare Borgia as a military commander. Machiavelli had been present when Cesare decided to eliminate his mercenary lieutenants and replace them with his own troops. This daring strategy appears to have had a decisive impact on the initial formation of Machiavelli's ideas. He refers to it as soon as he raises the question of military policy in Chapter 13, and treats it as an example of the measures that any ruler ought to adopt. Cesare is praised for having recognized that mercenaries are "uncertain and unfaithful," deserving to be mercilessly "wiped out." Machiavelli praises Cesare for having grasped the basic lesson that any new prince needs to learn if he wishes to maintain his principality: He must stop relying on fortune and foreign arms, raise "soldiers of his own," and make himself "sole master" of his own troops.

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